

Bank and non bank competition

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Bank and non-bank competition

- Banks not only compete between themselves
- They compete with other players such as
 - Bond market: direct market finance
 - Venture capitalists
 - Shadow banks
 - Fintechs
 - Bigtechs
 - etc
- Each player has different characteristics
 - Each case is in principle different
 - Depends on what is the main difference across agents
 - E.g Holmström and Tirole (monitoring vs no monitoring)

Bank and non bank competition

- Recent developments have changed the nature of bank and non bank competition
 - Increase in internet based economy - not so new -
 - Increase in computational processing power
 - Increase in data availability (or processing capability)
 - New payment methods (e.g. mobile based)
- These changes have a potential to affect banks and non banks
 - By altering the way banks do their business
 - Also because non banks now have "changed" and they are different competitors

Bank and non bank competition

- The relevance of non banks can be very important
 - Mortgage lending (57% of originations non banks)
 - Syndicated loan lending
 - Some payment services
- Hence understanding how they affect the financial market is relevant
 - It has a direct effect - what they do -
 - Also indirect - how do banks react -

Bank and (new) non-bank competition

- Review of situation in Vives (2019) and Berg (2021)
 - Focus on competition with new competitors
 - Mainly how screening technologies are different and affected
- Vives and Ye (2024) - 2 papers -
- Build closely to previous model on bank screening and info acquisition
 - Hauswald and Marquez (2003,2010)
 - Screening technologies exhibit strategic interactions
 - Higher screening by bank A affects bank B
 - As it is more probable that a rejected loan from bank A is a bad loan!
 - Bank B internalizes it and reacts by lending less (or at higher rates)

- "When fintechs compete for payment flows"
- Banks use payment information in their screening processes
 - Fintech compete with banks for payment services
- Some consumer might prefer to go to fintech
 - Heterogenous bank related tastes
- Banks react to fintech payment competition
 - by increasing or decreasing prices of payment services
 - Depends on distribution of preferences of costumers
- This affects the quality of screening in non monotonic ways
- Discuss how selling information from fintech to bank can improve outcomes

- "Open banking: Credit market competition when borrowers own the data"
- Study the effects of open banking
 - Sharing of info between banks and fintechs
 - Borrower can signup and share their data
- Banks have private info about consumers
 - Allows them to better screen borrowers
- Fintechs are better at processing data
 - But have less data
- Open banking allows fintechs to access data of borrowers
 - This enhances screening as fintechs are assumed to be better
 - But can make borrowers worse off as it lowers competition from banks

- Regulation as a determinant of who lends to whom
 - Banks fund themselves cheaper: deposit insurance
 - Have to have capital requirements: more expensive
 - Exact type of capital regulation affects structure of the system
 - Affects equilibrium risk of each loan (monitoring decisions)
 - Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2024)
 - Flat versus risk based capital regulation